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THE PARADOX OF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT-REVERSE DISCRIMINA-
TION-THE IMPLICATIONS OF Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d
698, 548 P.2d 320, cert. denied sub nom. Brabant v. City of Seattle,
97 S. Ct. 237 (1976).
On March 1, 1973, the engineering department of the City of Se-
attle appointed Emilio Ponce to fill a vacancy for signal electrician
foreman. Ponce, who was Spanish surnamed, was eligible under the
city's affirmative action plan. He was appointed under a civil service
selective certification procedure' pursuant to a departmental minority
hiring goal.2 The appointment complied with a 1972 executive order 3
and subsequent city ordinance establishing a Seattle-wide affirmative
1. The Seattle Civil Service Commission, established under article XVI of the
city charter, adopted the following rule providing for selective certification of
"underrepresented" applicants:
Where a certification of eligibles other than in the normal order is requested
in writing by the appointing authority as being necessary to implement the
Affirmative Action Program of the City of Seattle by achieving ratios of
minority, female and handicapped employees in all classifications of city
employment approximately equal to the ratios of these same minorities in
the Seattle community, and the secretary determines that the reasons given
fully justify the request, a certification may be made of only the highest rank-
ing eligibles of the particular race, creed, color, national origin or sex or
the highest ranking handicapped eligibles, as designated in the request.
Seattle Civil Service Laws and Rules, Rule 7.03(0) (Oct. 20, 1971).
The selective certification procedure requires a written request to the Commission
by the department head with a justification pursuant to departmental affirmative
action plans. The approval of the Secretary of the Commission and the director
of the city's Department of Human Rights is then required. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE
ch. 1.80 (1969) (Ordinance 97971, establishing Seattle Department of Human
Rights).
2. The engineering department had adopted a 1972 policy statement estab-
lishing as a departmental goal the achievement of minority ratios in each civil
service classification comparable to "the ratios of these same minorities in the
Seattle community." An emergency two-year measure (1972-74) stipulated that
"the first of every three vacancies from retirement or termination in under-repre-
sented classes will be filled by an appropriate minority from the civil service register
whenever possible." Seattle, Wash., Engineering Dep't, Policy Statement (June 21,
1972).
3. The executive order issued by the mayor of Seattle described the city's
affirmative action plan as
a program to increase the number of employees of a particular race, color,
national origin, or sex employed by the City in order to correct a condition
of underrepresentation of such persons caused by present or past practices,
customs, or circumstances that have liimited employment opportunities for
members of the affected groups.
The order called upon each city department to review and, if necessary, modify
rating systems and testing requirements to insure their compliance with standards
of job relatedness under federal, state, and local laws. Seattle, Wash., Exec. Order
Establishing an Affirmative Action Program for City Employment (Aug. 25, 1972)
(on file with the Washington Law Review).
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action program in municipal employment. 4 As a consequence of selec-
tive certification, Wesley Brabant, a non-minority civil service em-
ployee who ranked higher on the regular certification register, was
rejected in favor of Ponce.5
Seeking injunctive relief,6 Brabant intervened in a suit7 challenging
Seattle's affirmative action program as violating merit selection provi-
sions in the Seattle City Charter.8 The trial court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment9 and Brabant appealed. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs challenges to the selective
certification procedure and unanimously affirmed the summary judg-
ment. Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 698, 548 P.2d 320, cert.
denied sub nom. Brabant v. City of Seattle, 97 S. Ct. 237 (1976).
In upholding a municipal affirmative action plan, Lindsay provides
a point of departure for an analysis of the reverse discrimination 10
4. The Seattle City Council adopted a resolution affirming the mayor's order.
Seattle, Wash., Res. 23849 (Oct. 16, 1972). This was later formalized into an im-
plementation ordinance requiring city departments to establish affirmative action
plans with goals and timetables to achieve equal workforce representation.
SEATME, WASH., CODE ch. 1.49 (1972).
5. Brabant had taken the civil service exam for electrician foreman in 1969
and received a score of 88.58, placing him fourth on the promotional register of
eligibles. In 1970, he had been appointed as a relief foreman in the engineering
department to fill an intermittent vacancy. Ponce had taken the exam in 1969,
placing eighth with a score of 81.83. In 1972, he received an identical temporary
position. Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 698, 701-02, 548 P.2d 320, 323-24
(1976):
6. Brabant alleged violation of his rights by the city's refusal to certify his
name, and sought an injunction and nullification of Ponce's appointment. Complaint
in Intervention, Lindsay v. City of Seattle, No. 757364 (King County Super. Ct.,
filed Mar. 19, 1973).
7. The original plaintiffs were employed or promoted prior to trial, rendering
their complaint moot. The case proceeded pursuant to the complaint of plaintiff-
intervenor Brabant. Named defendants were the City of Seattle and its civil
service commissioners. Defendants in intervention were the United Construction
Workers Association (an organization formed to promote equal employment op-
portunity and seeking to protect its affirmative action agreement), Robert L.
Green (a minority eligible on the civil service register seeking to protect his in-
terest in the affirmative action program), and Emilio Ponce.
8. The Seattle City Charter provides for a single certification procedure: when
a department head notifies the civil service commission of a vacancy in a classi-
fied position, the commission is to certify to the appointing authority the five high-
est-scoring applicants or the top 25%, whichever is greater. SEATTLE CITY CHARTER
art. XVI, § 9 (1958, amended 1967). While Brabant was eligible for certification
under this procedure, Ponce was not. See note 5 supra.
9. Both plaintiff-Brabant and defendant-City of Seattle had filed sumiriary judg-
ment motions. Defendant's motion was granted and judgment entered. Lindsay v.
City of Seattle, No. 757364 (King County Super. Ct., Oct. 5, 1973) (Ringold, J.).
10. For purposes of this note, "reverse discrimination" will refer to situations in
which a minority preferential employment program operates to deny employment
opportunity to a qualified applicant from a non-preferred group on the basis of race.
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questions inherent in such plans. Following a brief history of the de-
velopment of preferential employment remedies and an examination
of the Lindsay decision, this note will evaluate preferential relief and
reverse discrimination within the framework of Lindsay, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 and recent court decisions. 12 Applica-
bility of the Lindsay methodology to future reverse discrimination
cases will be examined in light of apparent Supreme Court approval
of a reverse discrimination cause of action under Title VII. l3 Finally,
the note will evaluate criteria for the review of preferential employ-
ment programs 14 which will enable such programs to combine max-
imum efficacy with minimal reverse discrimination effects.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
CHALLENGES TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS
Elimination of racial discrimination in American society has been
hampered by the formidable task of developing effective remedial
measures. Eradication of present, institutionalized effects of past dis-
crimination has been especially complex, often calling for color-con-
scious affirmative relief to achieve the ultimate goal of colorblind
equality. 15 Such preferential treatment of minority individuals, 16 how-
ever, has given rise to allegations of reverse discrimination.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See Part I-A
infra.
12. Although constitutional arguments under the equal protection clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, are involved in reverse discrimination complaints and
preferential treatment cases, see note 19 infra, this note will examine the problem
within the statutory framework of Title VII. The Lindsay court limited its examina-
tion to this issue. For discussions of the equal protection issue, see DeFunis
Symposium, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 483 (1975); Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Developments in the Law-
Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
13. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). See Part
III-C infra.
14. "Affirmative action" connotes a broad concept which encompasses preferen-
tial treatment as well as affirmative recruitment efforts and minority training pro-
grams. The focus of this note is upon hiring remedies requiring employers to grant
racial preferences based upon an administrative, voluntary, or judicially mandated
remedial program.
15. One court has provided a succinct justification for not rigidly adhering to
strict neutrality principles in fashioning relief:
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To avoid conflict
with the equal protection clause, a classification that denies a benefit, causes a
harm, or imposes a burden must not be based on race. In that sense, the
Constitution is color blind. But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent
172
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A. Equal Employment Opportunity
In recognition of the need to achieve equal opportunity in employ-
ment, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17
Broadly proscribing discriminatory employment practices, 18 Title VII
has become the primary basis for employment discrimination litiga-
tion.' 9 It prescribes an administrative mechanism to handle employ-
discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.
The criterion is the relevancy of color to a legitimate governmental purpose.
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (1967), affd on
rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Board of Educ. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). Courts have manifested this "color conscious" approach
in several areas. See, e.g., United Jewish Organization, Inc. v. Carey, 97 S. Ct. 996
(1977); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971) (affirma-
tive use of mathematical ratios to correct past discrimination in public education);
Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973) (duty to con-
sider impact of public housing programs on racial concentration of area); Norwalk
CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (race-conscious ur-
ban renewal relocation standard required); Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1966) (purposeful inclusion of blacks in grand jury selection upheld).
16. The beneficiaries of affirmative action programs under Title VII may include
women. For the purposes of this note, however, references will be limited to racial
minority groups classified as "underrepresented" targets of affirmative relief.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 255
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). The commerce
clause provided the constitutional authorization for Title VII. 110 CONG. REc. 7209-12
(1964).
18. The Act states that it is an "unlawful employment practice":(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) to (a) (2) (1970).
The Act covers labor organizations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970 & Supp. V
1975); employment agencies, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1970); and private sector em-
ployers when "engaged in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more em-
ployees," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (Supp. V 1975). The Act also protects employees of
government, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)
to (f) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103 (1972)). In Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the 1972 amendments as
within congressional power to pass appropriate legislation to enforce the 14th amend-
ment. For a history of Title VII and its 1972 amendments, see Sape & Hart, Title VII
Reconsidered: The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972).
19. While this note will focus upon Title VII remedies, Title VII is not the ex-
clusive remedy for employment discrimination. Despite the comprehensive nature of
Title VII, its legislative history demonstrates congressional intent to allow inde-
pendent pursuit of employment rights under applicable federal and state statutes.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). See 110 CONG. REC.
7207 (1964) (Department of Justice memorandum explaining Title VII not meant to
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ment discrimination complaints20 and authorizes civil suits when the
preferred method of conciliation proves unsuccessful. 21 Judicial con-
be exclusive employment discrimination remedy); Sape & Hart, supra note 18, at
886 (examining parallel remedies).
The 14th amendment equal protection clause supplies supplemental remedies.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 5 of the 14th amendment provides: "The
Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871 under its 14th amendment
enforcement powers. The pertinent section creates a cause of action for depriva-
tion of constitutional and federal rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). In addition, a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 has been utilized
to challenge private-sector discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). The Supreme
Court has stated that this statute creates a cause of action for racial discrimination
in private employment. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
Sections 1981 and 1983 allow plaintiffs to avoid Title VII procedural requirements
(investigation, conciliation, statute of limitations). In addition, § 1981 allows punitive
damages and unlimited back pay awards. See also Brown v. General Servs. Admin.,
507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974), affd, 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (whether exhaustion of
Title VII remedies required).
Prior to passage of the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act amendments
expanding the coverage of Title VII to public employers, the equal protection
clause and related statutes provided the primary bases for employment discrimina-
tion charges by public employees. See, e.g., Vulcan Soc'y of the New York City
Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); Castro v.
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). Prior to the Title VII amendments and
prior to Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), see note 24 infra, courts would
apply equal protection and Title VII standards interchangeably on the rationale that
to do otherwise would create an anomalous distinction between public and private
discrimination standards. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972). 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 may apply to employees not
covered by Title VII (i.e., those employed by private clubs, religious organizations,
or employers with less than 15 employees). Presidential Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3
C.F.R. 169 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 10,294 (1970) (as amended
by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967)), mandates affirmative action
plans for federal and federally assisted contracts. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.1 to -1.47
and 60-2.1 to -2.32 (1976) (affirmative action guidelines).
Finally, state statutory and constitutional provisions provide additional bases for
relief. Indeed, Title VII requires a complainant to pursue state administrative
remedies prior to filing a complaint with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) to (d)
(Supp V 1975). The Act expressly disclaims an intent to preempt state action. Id. at
§ 2000e-7. Washington's statutory scheme is codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 49.60
(1976). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that Title VII cases provide "ap-
propriate" precedent under the Washington statute. Stieler v. Spokane School Dist. No.
81, 88 Wn. 2d 68, 558 P.2d 198 (1977). See also WASH. CONST. art. 1, §§ 3, 12 (due
process and equal protection guarantees).
20. The Act established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
as its enforcement agency and gave it the power and responsibility to hear allega-
tions of discrimination, conduct investigations, promulgate guidelines, and obtain
voluntary compliance. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 5 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). In a recent
sex discrimination case attempting to enforce adherence to EEOC guidelines regarding
pregnancy leave, the Supreme Court narrowly construed the agency's rulemaking
power as procedural only. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Thus,
the EEOC rule was not accorded great weight because it was not a contemporaneous
interpretation, and because it contradicted earlier agency policy and conflicted with
"other indicia of proper interpretation" of sex discrimination provisions of the Act.
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struction has been guided by recognition of a dual statutory purpose:
"eradicating discrimination throughout the economy, and making per-
sons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination. '22 Under
the "consequences" test of discrimination developed in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,23 proof of a racially disproportionate impact is sufficient
to establish a prima facie Title VII case.24 Unless the challenged prac-
tice can be justified as a business necessity, 25 the Act's remedial provi-
sions authorize affirmative judicial relief.26
Generally, the court has accorded great deference to EEOC interpretations. See, e.g.,
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
21. Either the EEOC or the person aggrieved may sue in federal district court.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
22. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (reviewing con-
ditions requiring an award of backpay relief under Title VII). See also Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (extending Albemarle rationale to Title
VII cases in which constructive seniority is used to redress discriminatory hiring
practices).
23. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The "consequences" test arises from the Court's state-
ment in Griggs that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 432.
24. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), set forth the re-
quirements for a prima facie non-class-action complaint involving a racial minority
in a hiring situation. In that case, a qualified racial minority member applied for a
position and was rejected by an employer who continued to seek applicants with
similar qualifications. Id. at 802. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273 (1976), extended Green to a non-minority in a discharge case. See notes 58-68
and accompanying text infra. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977), the Court further refined the prima facie case standard in the
context of a challenged seniority system. The Court stated that Green was not the
sole standard and "that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the burden of offering evi-
dence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on
discriminatory criterion [sic] illegal under the Act." Id. at 1866. The term "discrim-
inate," used in defining an "unlawful employment practice," is not defined in the Act.
The Court in Griggs held that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." 401 U.S. at 432. Thus,
if a plaintiff can demonstrate that an employment practice has a racially dispropor-
tionate impact, "the absence of intent does not redeem employment practices" un-
related to measuring job capabilities. Id. at 432. The Court noted that, under Title
VII, practices "neutral on their face" and "neutral in terms of intent" are not per-
missible if they "operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory practices."
Id. at 430. The Supreme Court recently held that the "consequences" test of Griggs
does not extend to constitutional claims of equal protection violations under the 14th
amendment. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (plaintiff must establish
purposeful discrimination). See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555, 566 n.21 (1977) (purposeful discrimination must
be the causal factor in the challenged action) (dictum).
25. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden is on the employer to
"articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged practice."
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). As the Court ex-
plained in Griggs: "The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited." 401 U.S. at 431.
26. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975), in civil actions by aggrieved
175
Washington Law Review
B. Preferential Relief Measures
To attain the goal of equal employment, government and private
employers have been faced with the task of combatting the present
effects of past discrimination. They have therefore implemented the
concept of affirmative action through the mechanism of preferential
treatment programs.2 7 It is not clear that Title VII authorizes such
parties courts are empowered to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include . . . reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay," enjoining the challenged practice, and ordering records and continuing reports.
This remedial provision of the Act is premised upon equitable powers. See, e.g., Lind-
say v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 698, 705, 548 P.2d 320, 325 (1976); accord, United
States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210,
216 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972). Cf. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d
315, 328 (8th Cir. 1971) (rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972)
(dealing with 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
27. Title VII authorizes implementation of affirmative relief measures. See note
26 supra. Compare Title VII with 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970), which fail to pro-
vide such explicit statutory authorization. Eight circuits have construed affirmative
action broadly to include preferential treatment of minorities under Title VII and 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983: Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d
1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); United States v. Wood, Wire
& Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939
(1973) (but see Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d
420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 73 (1976) (limiting the use of quotas));
United States v. Elevator Constructors Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976); NAACP
v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d
634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354
(8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971). But see Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th
Cir. 1973) (holding that 1866 Civil Rights Act and 14th amendment did not authorize
quotas). In Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976), however, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
limited Harper. While holding the instant case presented no compelling need for
quota relief, the court stated: "In view of substantial precedent sanctioning preferen-
tial relief for unlawful discrimination, we reject the company's argument that Title
VII forbids the remedy." Id. at 274. But see Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth
Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976) (distinguishing the Patterson recognition of
preferential treatment as dictum).
Under Presidential Exec. Order No. 11,246, supra note 19, federal contractors
are required to adopt "good faith" efforts to maintain minority hiring goals under
area-wide affirmative action plans. Courts have upheld such plans. Southern I1l. Bldrs.
v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. I11. 1971), affd, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972)
(Illinois Plan); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa.
1970), affd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (Philadelphia
Plan); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.NJ. 1970) (Newark Plan); Wiener
v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969)
(Cleveland Plan). Some commentators have concluded that the reluctance of the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance to enforce executive order affirmative action
plans due to perceived "unrealistically high goals" has made such plans "largely
ineffective." Edwards & Zahretsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment Dis-
crimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30 n.149 (1975) (citing Donegan, The Philadelphia
Plan: A Viable Means of Achieving Equal Opportunity in the Construction Industry
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action. Indeed, section 703(j) of the Act at first blush appears to re-
strict preferential percentage-based remedies.28 Courts have chosen to
construe this section narrowly, however, by limiting its application to
instances in which racial imbalances are not attributable to unlawful
discriminatory conduct. 29 The broad remedial goals of Title VII are
said to justify this interpretation.3 0
or More Pie in the Sky?, 20 KAN. L. REV. 195, 210 (1972) and Jones, Federal
Contract Compliance in Phase fl-The Dawning of the Age of Enforcement of
Equal Opportunity Obligations, 4 GA. L. REv. 756 (1970)).
The Washington statutory scheme, WASH. REv. CODE ch. 49.60 (1976), see note
19 supra, created the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) with
the power to promulgate guidelines and regulations. One such guideline defines a
"corrective employment program'; under the statute as "designed to increase the
number of employees of a particular protected class ...to correct a condition of
underrepresentation of such employees caused by present or past practices, customs
or usages ... that have limited employment opportunities." WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
162-18-010 (1974). Corrective employment programs may be used (1) by court or
administrative order, (2) by WSHRC consent, or (3) voluntarily, requiring WSHRC
approval to depart from W.A.C. guidelines. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-18-050 (1976).
As noted in brief for respondent City and Civil Service Commission in Lindsay,
Seattle's affirmative action program had been transmitted to WSHRC under WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 162-18, and a 1972 memorandum by the attorney general's office in-
dicated probable approval. Brief for Respondents, Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 86
Wn. 2d 698, 548 P.2d 320 (1976). The WSHRC guidelines recognize that a posture
of neutrality may not eliminate a pattern of discrimination, and corrective steps may
be required. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-18-020 (1976). Thus a corrective employment
program in compliance with the chapter will not constitute an unfair practice under
the statute. Id.
28. Section 703G) provides in pertinent parts:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer . .. to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of race ... on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect
to the total number or percentage of persons of any race ... employed by any
employer . . . in comparison with the total number or pecentage.of persons of
such race ...in any community, State, section or other area, or in the avail-
able work force in any community, State, section or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
29. Examples of courts upholding preferential treatment under Title VII while
reconciling § 703() include: Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 630 (2d
Cir. 1974); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408,
413 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Local 212, IBEW,
472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th
Cir. 1973) rev'g 338 F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. Mo. 1972); United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v.
IBEW Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970). But see
Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 634 (Hays, J., dissenting). See also
dictum in NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974), and Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (both cases brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
30. In United States v. IBEW Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 943 (1970), the court stated that any other interpretation would constitute
"a complete nullification of the purpose of the Civil Rights Act." Id. at 149-50. The
court cited legislative history to indicate it was not congressional intent to forbid
preferential remedies. However, examination of legislative history fails to establish
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The statutory and constitutional validity of affirmative action goals
or quotas31 is far from settled.3 2 While the potential for reverse dis-
crimination has been considered by lower courts reviewing preferen-
tial programs, there have been few direct reverse discrimination chal-
conclusively legislative approval of this proposition. In 1964, the Act's floor leader,
Sen. Humphrey, remarked:
A new subsection, 703(j), is added to deal with the problem of racial balance
among employees. The proponents of this bill have carefully stated on numerous
occasions that Title VII does not require an employer to achieve any sort of
racial balance in his work force by giving preferential treatment to any individual
or group. Since doubts have persisted, subsection (j) is added to state this
point expressly.
110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964). See also 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (the "bugaboo"
of requiring a hiring, firing, or promotion to meet a racial quota is "non-existent")
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (interpretive memorandum
of Title VII by floor managers, Senators Clark and Case, stating Title VII does not
require a racial balance and "any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance
would involve a violation of Title VII"); cf. 110 CONG. REC. 8921 (1964) (the purpose
of § 7030) was simply to prevent a finding of discrimination on the basis of a racial
imbalance).
More recently, Congress rejected an attempt to abolish goal-based relief during
consideration of the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act amendments. 118
CONG. REC. 1662-76 (1972) (debate and rejection of an amendment explicitly for-
bidding goals, quotas, or ranges; opponents cited federal cases in which courts re-
jected the argument that preferential treatment runs afoul of § 703(j)); 118 CONG.
REc. 4918 (1972) (defeat of an amendment which would have extended § 7030) to
executive orders and other federal statutes, thereby cancelling the Philadelphia Plan
approach to affirmative action). In light of federal appellate court approval of goal-
based preferences, one might infer congressional acquiescence, if not approval. See
United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court has yet to interpret § 7030). Cf. International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1856 n.20 (1977) (statistical evidence of racial
imbalance does not violate § 7030)). However, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975) (holding a denial of backpay justifiable only for reasons in
compliance with statutory purposes of Title VII), the Court viewed congressional
rejection of amendments to limit judicial power to award backpay as tacit approval
of backpay relief. Id. at 420. In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976), the Court refused to treat confusing legislative history as a restriction on
equitable relief powers under the Act. The Court rejected the argument that §
703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) (protecting "bona fide" seniority systems)
was a barrier to constructive seniority relief. See also United States v. Elevator Con-
structors Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying the Franks rationale of
§ 703(h) and the Albemarle inference of congressional approval of preferential goals
to rebut an argument that § 7030) applied). The Supreme Court did not draw such
an inference, however, in its interpretaton of § 703(h). International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977). In upholding a seniority system which
allegedly perpetuated prior discrimination, the Court stated that the views of the 1972
Congress were "entitled to little if any weight." Id. at 1864 n.39. This conclusion is
contrary to numerous circuit court holdings and EEOC rulings. Id. at 1876-77 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
31. Courts have frequently distinguished goals from quotas. See note 48 and
accompanying text infra.
32. Lower federal courts have relied on statutory interpretation and precedent
rather than providing a comprehensive constitutional justification for preferential
remedies. See, e.g., Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 150 n.20 (3d Cir. 1975) ("many
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lenges. 33 The Supreme Court has consistently denied review of cases
involving preferential employment programs,34 and it has yet to rule
on a reverse discrimination challenge to such a plan.35
II. REASONING OF THE LINDSAY COURT
Plaintiffs primary challenge to Seattle's selective certification pro-
cess, and to the corresponding affirmative action plan of the city engi-
neering department, was that they violated city charter provisions guar-
judicial authorities"); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 274 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976) ("substantial precedent"); Morrow v. Crisler,
491 F.2d 1053, 1059 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (opinion noting that "overwhelming
precedent" constrained concurrence). A more reasoned attempt to analyze constitu-
tional issues in affirmative hiring relief can be found in NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d
614 (5th Cir. 1974). Challenges to affirmative action goals or quotas have occurred
primarily in the context of appellate review of court-mandated preferential programs
to relieve discriminatory employment practices (as opposed to reverse discrimination
challenges to program validity). See note 27 supra. See, e.g., United States v. Iron-
workers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971) (upheld
affirmative action percentage requirement for union membership and training pro-
grams in a Title VII action); cf. Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d
1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975) (action under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1970), upholding hiring ratio until percentage of minorities is equal to popula-
tion percentage); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D.
Pa. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (upheld
imposition of minority hiring goals in area-wide affirmative action plans under
presidential executive order) (see note 19 supra).
33. Absence of proof of racial discrimination rather than denial of standing under
Title VII provided the basis for denying reverse discrimination challenges in Mellick
v. EEOC, 410 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Smith v. Gunther, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec.
6800 (D.D.C. 1975); Leinster v. Engmann, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6241 (D.D.C. 1974);
Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1625 (E.D. Va. 1973). In Weber v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976) (Title VII ac-
tion by white employees challenging affirmative action quota system incorporated
into collective bargaining agreement), the court held a quota system inappropriate
under the factual circumstances and rejected preferential treatment as violating
Title VII's "prohibitions against racial discrimination by an employer against any
individual." Id. at 766 (emphasis added).
34. E.g., Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 698, 548 P.2d 320, cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 237 (1976); Associated Gen'l Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490
F.2d 9 (Ist Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974) (state executive order pref-
erential plan); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) (Title VII preferential program); Carter
v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (14th
amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 preferential program); Contractors Ass'n v. Secre-
tary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (executive order affirmative action plan).
35. See notes 32 & 33 supra. In DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded as moot a reverse discrimination challenge to
the constitutional validity of a law school preferential admissions program. In dissent,
Justice Douglas reached the merits, stating, "There is no constitutional right for any
race to be preferred .... Whatever his race, [the reverse discrimination plaintiff]
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anteeing merit selection.36 The Lindsay court approached this argu-
ment within a Title VII framework by analogizing to the statutory
requirements and applying Title VII precedent.37 The court stated
that a major purpose of Title VII is employment equality and that the
city's selective certification process was designed to achieve that goal. 38
Then the court examined the conditions which were thought to
make the affirmative action program necessary. The court concluded
that statistical evidence of the disproportionate racial composition of
the city's work force established a prima facie case of past employ-
ment discrimination under Griggs.39
The preferential relief measure adopted by the city was then exam-
ined to determine if the measure was necessary and appropriate to al-
leviate discrimination in municipal employment. The court pointed
had a constitutional right to have his application considered in a racially neutral
manner." Id. at 320, 336-37. See generally Morris, Equal Protection, Affirmative
Action and Racial Preferences in Law Admissions: DeFunis v. Odegaard, 49 WASH.
L. REv. 1 (1973). The California Supreme Court recently held a somewhat similar
medical school minority admissions program to be an unconstitutional violation of
the rights of non-minority applicants under the equal protection clause. The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 18 Cal. 3d 34,
553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
But see Alevy v. Downstate Medical Ctr., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.
2d 82 (1976). The effect upon Title VII preferential plans of a Supreme Court affirm-
ance in Bakke will be dependent upon the breadth of the Court's opinion. A blanket
disapproval of the preferential relief measure under the equal protection clause
might also be applicable to Title VII. On the other hand, the Court could limit the
holding to the facts of the case, without disturbing programs approved under Title
VII. The Court has indicated an interest in limiting the decision to a statutory
basis. It has requested briefs on Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bars
race discrimination in federally assisted programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6
(1970). 46 U.S.L.W. 3261 (Oct. 17, 1977).
36. Brief for Appellant at 6, Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 698, 548 P.2d
320 (1976). Appellant argued that article XVI, § 9 of the city charter, authorizing
appointment of the top five or 25% of applicants, was the exclusive method of
appointment and that the civil service commission lacked the power to supplement
it contrary to the charter.
37. 86 Wn. 2d at 701, 548 P.2d at 324 (noting that the City of Seattle was an
"employer" under the Act).
38. Id. at 702-03, 548 P.2d at 323-24. The selective certification rule was adopted
in conjunction with a resolution recognizing that
civil service tests have had the effect, in some cases, of discriminating against
minority applicants among those deemed eligible for appointment . . . [and
that the] results [of the tests] tend to cause the minority applicants to be
placed at the lower end of the eligible registers and therefore have little or no
chance of being employed.
Id. at 703-04, 548 P.2d at 324-25.
39. Id. at 704, 548 P.2d at 325. The following factors were considered relevant
justifications for Ponce's selective certification: (1) of the three signal electrician fore-
men in the department, none was a minority; (2) only 6% of all department foremen
were minorities; (3) of unskilled laborers in the department, 36.7% were minorities;
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out that an employer could not be indifferent and thereby perpetuate
past racial inequalities. 40 Although recognizing the paradox of "re-
sorting to preferences or devices premised on inequality" to attain
equality,41 the court nevertheless failed to discuss section 703j) of
Title VII, which purports to restrict preferential remedies.42 Drawing
an analogy from other contexts, the court noted that the "need or
merit of a certain individual provides a politically and economically
justifiable basis for preferential treatment. '43 Seattle's voluntary im-
plementation of an affirmative action plan was specifically approved
as consistent with the tenor of Title VII.4 4
The court concluded that without the selective certification rule the
city charter would actually violate Title VII by perpetuating in-
equality via its merit provisions. 45 For this reason, the court invoked
the federal supremacy clause to approve the preferential program,
and (4) 12.7% of city employees were minorities. Id. The court relied on statistics
provided by the city's director of the Department of Human Resources comparing
minority employment in the city with minority census figures for the city. For an ex-
amination of the data and its accuracy as an indicator of past discrimination, see note
73 infra (i.e., a 14.7% minority census figure for 1970 was compared to a 7.6% em-
ployment figure for 1969, increasing to 12.7% by 1972). An additional consideration
cited by the court was the fact that the EEOC had formally charged Seattle with
violating Title VII for using unvalidated tests with a disproportionate impact on mi-
norities. Id. at 703, 548 P.2d at 324. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
40. 86 Wn. 2d at 705-06, 548 P.2d at 326.
41. Id. at 707, 548 P.2d at 326.
42. Conceivably, the Lindsay court did not feel obligated to discuss the issue
either because of the accepted judicial construction limiting its applicability, see notes
28-30 and accompanying text supra, or because of the absence of a direct Title VII
claim.
43. 86 Wn. 2d at 707, 548 P.2d at 326. The court referred to veterans' pref-
erences in public employment and general preferential treatment for the handicapped
as examples of accepted societal preferences. For additional examples, see 16 WASH-
BuRN LJ. 421, 425 (1977). See also Massachusetts v. Feeney, 46 U.S.L.W. 3237 (Oct.
11, 1977), in which the Supreme Court vacated and remanded a decision finding an
equal protection violation under a state law granting preferences to military veterans
applying for public jobs. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), holding discriminatory intent necessary to find a con-
stitutional violation.
44. 86 Wn. 2d at 706, 548 P.2d at 326.
45. Id. at 708, 548 P.2d at 327. Other courts have also upheld quota relief
despite merit-based civil service laws. See, e.g., Vulcan Soe'y of the New York City
Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that
discriminatory impact of civil service exam justified one-for-three quota); Carter v.
Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1971) (rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 950 (1972) (denying absolute preference but upholding one-for-two hiring ratio).
Courts which have ruled against affirmative relief measures have noted the conflict
with merit-based civil service laws. See, e.g., Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of
Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 480 (1976)
(denying enforcement of permanent promotional quota to remedy discriminatory
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allowing Title VII's mandate to override any conffict with local civil
service laws. 46 The court cautioned that approval of such relief was
conditional, however, and would terminate upon achievement of a
"fair approximation" of minority representation in city employment.47
The court quickly disposed of plaintiffs remaining objections to the
city's program. Brabant contended that the program was overly broad
in scope, even if otherwise justifiable. The court responded by distin-
guishing Seattle's permissible goal-based program from the apparently
more constitutionally suspect "absolute quota" system,48 citing federal
effect of state civil service exams); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 341 N.Y.S.2d 441,
293 N.E.2d 819 (1973) (finding state education commissioner acted arbitrarily in re-
quiring permanent appointment of a minority who had failed a civil service exam pre-
viously found discriminatory in federal court); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of
Dayton, 35 Ohio App. 2d 196, 301 N.E.2d 269 (1973) (upholding a challenge to
city affirmative action promotional plan as violative of city charter civil service
provisions).
46. 86 Wn. 2d at 708, 548 P.2d at 327. See also Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d
315, 327, 328 (8th Cir. 1971) (rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
In Carter, the court acknowledged that state and local law required civil service
examination procedures, but held that this requirement "must give way to the
Supremacy Clause of Article 6 of the United States Constitution," and therefore
must yield to the national policy of equal economic opportunity. See also Associa-
ted Gen'l Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973). In Alt-
shuler, challengers to a state-imposed affirmative action program invoked the supre-
macy clause. The court held, however, that the federal plan in Title VII does not
preempt states from implementing their own affirmative action plans.
47. The fair approximation standard, although potentially ambiguous in applica-
tion, is significant because it enunciates the Washington standard for review of the
durational validity of preferential treatment goals. It reflects the limitation generally
imposed by federal courts approving temporary employment quotas. See, e.g.,
Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (measuring the
termination point at which the effects of past discrimination are "effectively offset"
with the caveat that population proportions need not be mirrored); NAACP v. Allen,
493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974) ("temporary" duration); Carter v. Gallagher, 452
F.2d 315, 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1971) (rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972) ("fair approximation" of minority representation consistent with population mix
of the area). See generally Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense and Law in Labor
Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 675, 695
(1974).
The Supreme Court's language in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971) (approving quotas to remedy education discrimination) has
been applied to employment discrimination cases to emphasize that "mathematical
precision" is not required. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622,
630 (2d Cir. 1974). The significance of the "termination" limitation to preferential
programs is demonstrated in Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), where the permanence of a quota caused the
court to bar its imposition, characterizing it as reverse discrimination. The same cir-
cuit had earlier upheld a quota system which the Kirkland court distinguished as
"interim." See Vulcan Soc'y of the New York City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 398 (2d Cir. 1973).
48. In Lindsay, the court stated that "[a] goal, as opposed to an absolute quota
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court decisions authorizing goal-based relief.49 The court briefly dis-
missed plaintiff's argument that the selective certification rule violated
the state's delegation-of-powers doctrine.50 As for Brabant's allegation
or preference, does not subject an employer to sanction. An employer is not expected
to displace existing employees or to create unneeded positions to meet his goal."
Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d at 711, 548 P.2d at 328. Courts upholding
preferential treatment have recognized the distinction between "goals" and "quotas"
as one of duration:
We use "goals" rather than "quotas" throughout this opinion for the reason that
while to some the two words may be synonymous, the term "quotas" implies
a permanence not associated with "goal." For our purpose the significance of the
distinction lies in the fact that once a prescribed goal is achieved the [defen-
dant] will not be obligated to riaintain it, provided, of course, the [defendant]
does not engage in discriminatory conduct.
Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 628 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974). See also
R. ONEIL, DISCRIMINATING AGAINST DISCRIINATION 68 (1975) (" [a] goal simply
declares an objective, which will be met only if a sufficient number of qualified per-
sons apply [sic], while a quota specifies the number to be admitted from a given
group regardless of the pool of qualified applicants."). Other observers are skeptical
of any meaningful differentiation. 118 CONG. REC. 1663 (1972) (remarks of Sen.
Ervin dismissing the goal/quota distinction as "specious"); see Comment, Hiring
Goals: California State Government and Title VII: Is This Numbers Game Legal?,
9 PAC. LJ. 49, 70 (1977) (labeling the goal/quota distinction as "semantics not sub-
stance"). For purposes of this note, the characteristics of duration and flixibility
which have been recognized as distinguishing "goals" from "quotas" will be ex-
amined independently rather than subsumed under a definitional distinction.
49. See 86 Wn. 2d at 711, 548 P.2d at 329 and cases cited therein. All citations
were to public employment cases brought under the 14th amendment and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970), and decided prior to Washington v.-Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), see
note 32 supra. The Lindsay court had noted earlier in its opinion that the "test of
the validity of employee selection procedures under [Title VII] is comparable to the
test of their validity over the long run under the Fourteenth Amendment." 86 Wn.
2d at 705, 538 P.2d at 325. This position was subsequently rejected by the Supreme
Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
50. Plaintiff had challenged the delegation of responsibility, under the selective
certification rule, to the secretary of the Seattle Civil Service Commission to certify
names of eligible candidates upon request from an appointing authority. 86 Wn. 2d
at 709, 548 P.2d at 327. The court upheld the delegation under Washington's lenient
delegation-of-power test as set forth in Barry & Barry v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 81 Wn. 2d 155, 159, 500 P.2d 540, 542-43 (1972). Although the Washington
test diminished the strength of the plaintiff's argument in Lindsay, another state
court upheld an unlawful delegatibh of p6wer-challenge. Wisconsifi v. Departmeht
of Ind., Labor & Human Rights, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1447 (Wis. Cir. Ct.
1976) (activities of affirmative action unit established under executive order usurped
legislativb power).
More often, imposition of ratio hiring and promotions by administrative bodies
has been invalidated as exceeding statutory power under state fair employment legisla-
tion. In a case decided after Lindsay, the Washington court held that the Higher Edu-
cation Personnel Board had exceeded statutory power in adopting administrative
affirmative action procedures relating to seniority. Washington Fed'n of State Employees
v. Higher Educ. Personnel Bd., 87 Wn. 2d 823, 557 P.2d 336 (1976). The court
confined its holding to this narrow issue, stating: "We make no determination as to
the propriety of a dual-seniority layoff system and do not intend for this holding to
affect the position taken by this court in Lindsay v. Seattle ... or DeFunis v.
Odegaard ... ." Id. at 827, 557 P.2d at 339 (citations omitted). In Lige v. Town of
Montclair, 134 NJ. Super. 277, 340 A.2d 660 (1975), affd, 72 NJ. 5, 367 A.2d 833
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that he had been denied equal protection of the law, the court held
that this issue was precluded from appellate review on procedural
grounds. 51
III. LINDSAY'S METHODOLOGY AND ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO TITLE VII CLAIMS OF REVERSE
DISCRIMINATION
A. The Precedential Value of Lindsay
Lindsay presented a classic reverse discrimination situation, charac-
terized by a clear causal relationship between the challenged preferen-
tial program and the alleged discrimination. The court upheld selec-
tive certification as mandated by Griggs and Title VII, although plain-
tiffs challenge on appeal was limited to the conflict with civil service
merit provisions. Thus, Lindsay supports the proposition that Title VII
standards govern state or local reverse discrimination cases,5 2 even
when the reverse discrimination victim does not allege that enforcing
the preferential program violated his rights under Title VII. Develop-
ments subsequent to Lindsay reinforce the availability of a reverse
discrimination cause of action under Title VII. 53
(1976), the court upheld a challenge to a one-to-one hiring and promotional ratio
imposed under a state fair employment law because the plan exceeded statutory
power and violated the state constitution. Set also Associated Gen'l Contractors of
Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (lst Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957
(1974).
51. Prior to trial, the parties had stipulated that the case raised no constitutional
questions of equal protection because of the decision of the Washington Supreme
Court in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wn. 2d 11, 508 P.2d 158 (1973). Brief for Respon-
dent at 27, Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 698, 548 P.2d 320 (1976). The
court noted that "[u] nder familiar principles of law, issues not considered by the
trial court need not be considered on appeal." Id. at 708, 548 P.2d at 327. Plaintiff-
Brabant unsuccessfully contended that because respondent-city had argued the con-
stitutional issue to the trial court and because the summary judgment stated that the
"city of Seattle has a legal duty to take affirmative action ... under the 14th amend-
ment," id., the issue was properly before the supreme court. Reply Brief for Appel-
lant at 8-9, Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 698, 548 P.2d 320 (1976). In
DeFunis, the Washington Supreme Court upheld a preferential law school admission
program because it served a "compelling state interest." Following oral arguments,
the United States Supreme Court remanded the case as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974),
because DeFunis had been allowed to attend school and would soon graduate. On
remand, a divided court was unable to rule on a motion to reinstate the original
decision. 84 Wn. 2d 617, 529 P.2d 438 (1974).
52. See Stieler v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 88 Wn. 2d 68, 558 P.2d 198
(1977) (use of Title VII precedent under Washington's anti-discrimination law). See
note 19 supra.
53. See Part III-C infra.
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B. Lindsay's Methodology
Uncertainties pervade any examination of reverse discrimination
challenges to preferential affirmative action programs. The difficulties
inherent in evaluating reverse discrimination challenges are aug-
mented by the absence of a clear statutory or constitutional justifica-
tion for preferential programs.5 4 Despite numerous obstacles, a deci-
sion-making process for reverse discrimination controversies must be
defined. The Lindsay approach emphasizes the goal of eradicating
past discrimination against members of minority groups by adjudi-
cating solely on the merits of the preferential employment process. 55
Under this analysis, a court reviews the challenged program, and if it
is justified under applicable standards,56 reverse discrimination is
permitted as an inevitable byproduct of equal employment goals.57
Initially, this approach ignores the merits of the reverse discrimination
claim itself, and thus may have to be modified in light of McDonald v.
54. Courts have struggled to rationalize imposing preferential treatment under
Title VII even though § 703(j) of the Act purports to withdraw such authorization.
See notes 28-30 supra. Some courts, including Lindsay, have ignored the limitation.
See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973). See also
note 32 supra (reliance on precedent in the absence of a comprehensive constitutional
justification). One consequence of providing alternative and frequently overlapping
remedies has been the compounding of various pleas with "inextricably interwoven"
standards of judicial review. See 8 Loy. CmI. LJ. 225, 226 (1976). For example, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (1970) were frequently pleaded together in claims against
government employers; therefore, § 1981 standards (with a 13th amendment basis)
were explained under the 14th amendment standards applied to § 1983. See 8 Loy.
Cni. LJ. 225, 233 n.34.
55. A constitutional rationale for such an approach was stated in NAACP v.
Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1975): "Until the selection procedures . . . have been
properly validated, it is illogical to argue quota hiring produces unconstitutional
'reverse' discrimination .... " Id. at 618. The Lindsay opinion established a justifica-
tion for preferential treatment under Title VII, invoking the supremacy clause to
foreclose reliance on civil service merit procedures. See notes 40-46 and accompany-
ing text supra. The court avoided express reliance on the fact that the city's testing
device was not validated. See note 39 supra. As noted in the Brief for Respondent
in Intervention (Legal Services) at 2, Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 698, 548
P.2d 320 (1976), the city charter certification procedure "eliminates from considera-
tion a disproportionate number of minority applicants who, having achieved a pass-
ing exam score, are presumptively qualified for employment." The Washington court
reiterated the need to establish job qualifications to maintain an individual action
under state anti-discrimination laws in Stieler v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 88
Wn. 2d 68, 558 P.2d 198 (1977). See note 19 supra.
56. Standards to consider when reviewing preferential programs are developed
in Part IV infra.
57. See notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra. See also DeFunis v. Ode-




Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,5 8 a recent United States Supreme
Court decision.
C. The Impact of McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.
In McDonald, the Supreme Court stated that Title VII prohibits
discrimination against whites as well as blacks. 59 The case involved
the dismissal of white employees charged with misappropriating prop-
erty from their private-sector employer, while a black employee, simi-
larly charged, was retained. The Court upheld the claim of reverse
discrimination pursuant to Title VII.60 The implications of the Mc-
Donald holding for preferential programs remain in doubt. The Court
noted that the employer had specifically denied that its challenged
disciplinary action related to an affirmative action program.61 Thus,
the McDonald ruling could be narrowly construed to authorize white
challenges against non-remedial discrimination. 62 The Court might
still determine that Title VII was not designed to deal with claims of
reverse discrimination against preferential programs.6 3 Indeed, it
58. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
59. Although the issue of white standing under Title VII has not received con-
siderable attention in lower federal courts, conflicting decisions have arisen. Cases
supporting white standing include Parks v. Brennan, 389 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ga.
1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.
1975). Cases concluding that whites lack standing include Haber v. Klassen, 10 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1446 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Mele v. United States Dep't of Justice,
10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5066 (D.N.J. 1975); United States v. International Longshore-
men's Ass'n, 334 F. Supp. 976 (S.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
EEOC v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 511 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975) (dictum).
60. 427 U.S. at 285. The Court was unanimous as to the Title VII issue. The
general proposition that whites are protected under Title VII was conceded by
respondents, Brief for Respondents at 16, and the standing issue was not argued
below. The lower court had found that petitioners had failed to state a claim on
which Title VII relief could be granted. The Supreme Court failed to reach the
merits and remanded the case to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to demonstrate their
dismissal was prompted by an impermissible racial motive. The Court also ex-
tended standing to whites under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970), a position generating vigorous dispute. See 427 U.S. at 296 (White, J., dis-
senting) (citing his dissent in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 192 (1976)).
61. The Court stated: "[W] e emphasize that we do not consider here the per-
missibility of [an affirmative action] program, whether judicially required or other-
wise prompted." 427 U.S. at 280 n.8.
62. Such an interpretation would restrict McDonald to its facts and acknowledge
white standing to obtain redress for a form of discrimination "which Title VII was
most clearly intended to remedy." 42 Mo. L. REv. 100, 104 (1977).
63. Respondents argued that while they were willing to concede the general
proposition that whites are protected under Title VII, the "Court should consider
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could simply define "discrimination" prohibited under the Act to ex-
clude inequitable treatment resulting from preferential relief meas-
ures.
64
Such a holding, however, would mark a retreat from the Court's
language in McDonald. The Court concluded: "We therefore hold
today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white
petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be appli-
cable were they Negroes and [the non-discharged Negro employee]
white. ' 65 A mechanical application of the Court's "same standards"
rationale would sustain a reverse discrimination challenge to a prefer-
ential relief program 66 and trigger the Act's remedial provisions. 67 At
the very least, the McDonald holding establishes that reverse discrimi-
nation cannot be ignored as a viable cause of action under Title VII.68
D. Alternatives to the Lindsay Approach
After McDonald, the methodology of the Lindsay court would ap-
the impact of such a ruling on the various forms of 'affirmative action' programs"
before ruling Title VII required that "each and every employment decision . . . be
absolutely colorblind." Brief for Respondent at 16, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). The Court's ruling did not encompass such a
broad holding; however, the general precedent and legislative history relied upon will
make it difficult for the Court to conclude that whites have no standing under Title
VII to challenge preferential programs.
64. Because "discrimination" is not defined in Title VII, courts have defined the
term by analogy on an ad hoc basis. The Court has recently stated that the meaning
of discrimination for 14th amendment equal protection purposes provides guidance
for its Title VII statutory meaning. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125(1976). Under Washington v. Davis, however, the fourteenth amendment has more
stringent standards than Title VII for a prima facie violation. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
See note 24 supra.
65. 427 U.S. at 280 (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the Court
gave "great deference" to an EEOC interpretation. Id. at 279 (1976). But cf.
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (Court refused to accord deference
to EEOC interpretations regarding pregnancy leave under the Act). See note 20
supra. In Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va.
1976), a court had an opportunity to examine a reverse discrimination claim in the
affirmative action context. The court held that the plaintiff need not establish that
"but for" the preferential program he would have been hired. A prima facie case
could be established by showing discrimination because of sex.
66. For a discussion of the prima facie standard, see note 24 supra.
67. See note 26 supra.
68. The McDonald Court relied heavily upon Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), and the prima facie standard of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), see 427 U.S. at 281-85. Given the Court's reliance on
prior Title VII cases, one author observed that "it is reasonable to argue that other
Title VII decisions should be available to white plaintiffs seeking Title VII relief."
42 Mo. L. REv. 100, 104 (1977).
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pear inappropriate under Title VII because it does not examine the
possible weight of the reverse discrimination claim. There are two al-
ternative approaches to reverse discrimination challenges, however,
which could satisfy McDonald.
The first alternative is to authorize remedial measures for reverse
discrimination regardless of the propriety of the preferential program.
Allowing injunctive relief against such programs once a reverse dis-
crimination claim has been established would discourage the adoption
of preferential relief measures, however limited or supervised. If we
are to retain the option of using such programs to promote equal em-
ployment opportunity goals, therefore, this approach must be rejected.
A better approach is to use a two-step process. First, the court
could examine the reverse discrimination claim; 69 if that claim is mer-
itorious, the court could then evaluate the preferential employment
practice. The formulation of relief measures would turn on a compar-
ison of plaintiff's right to non-discriminatory employment and defend-
ant's attempt to comply with Title VII. The following section attempts
to delineate the contours of this interest-balancing approach by exam-
ining standards to be employed in judging the validity of preferential
treatment programs.
IV. DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF PREFERENTIAL
RELIEF PROGRAMS UNDER TITLE VII
A. Evidence of Past Discrimination
The general rationale advanced to support imposition of preferen-
tial treatment is the eradication of present effects of past discrimina-
tion.70 Thus, documentation of past discrimination is an important
element in justifying a preferential treatment program. 7' The gener-
ally accepted use of statistical data to establish this historical predicate
69. Thus, cases in which reverse racial discrimination could not be proved would
still be eliminated. See note 33 supra.
70. See Part I-B supra. For an excellent general discussion of criteria which have
been used to determine the validity of preferential relief programs, see Edwards &
Zahretsky, supra note 27, passim.
71. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 361 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(197 1). Evidence of past discrimination is not a requisite finding in Title VII actions;
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and substantiate the prima facie case, as in Lindsay, should be exam-
ined carefully. Although a general racial population disparity may be
sufficient to establish a prima facie case,72 greater precision in de-
tailing labor force composition and skills may be called for at the
remedial stage7 3 to ensure adequate scope and durational limitations
upon program implementation.7 4
nevertheless, it may serve to justify preferential treatnent. See Porcelli v. Titus, 431
F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971). When courts have
struck down preferential quotas as violative of Title VII, they have found that the
programs could not be justified as corrective or past discriminatory practices. See, e.g.,
Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 480 (1977); Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School
Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (enjoining goal-based hiring program, even
though conditioned on qualified applicants, because not corrective of past discrimin-
ation); Hiatt v. City of Berkeley, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7047 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1975) (in-
validating city affirmative action plan due to lack of documented past discrimination
in city hiring); accord, Brunetti v. City of Berkeley, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7363 (N.D.
Cal. 1975).
72. See note 24 supra.
73. This point was recognized in Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622
(2d Cir. 1974), in which the court found that statistics showing racial imbalance in
union membership may establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The court
cautioned against the uncritical use of statistics in developing quota relief:
[Courts] should be guided by the most precise standards and statistics available
in view of the delicate constitutional balance that must be struck in the use of
such goals or quotas between the elimination of discriminatory effects, which
is permissible, and the involvement of the court in unjustifiable "reverse racial
discrimination," which is not.
Id. at 633. The court also noted the preference for use of work force statistics or
labor force figures rather than general population statistics on racial composition.
It should be noted, however, that establishing goals for union membership and train-
ing programs, as opposed to hiring goals, should not be restricted to work force
ratios, as long-term discrimination has prevented equal opportunity to attain the nec-
essary skills. See also United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471
F.2d 408, 412 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) (in the absence of a
reliable basis upon which to approximate minority participation in the industry but
for discriminatioh, total population figures are allowable); Vulcan Soc'y of the New
York City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 398-99 (2d Cir.
1973) (necessity required authorizing a ratio figure that does not "purport to rest on
any scientific basis"); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410
F. Supp. 873 (D. Cal. 1976).
The Lindsay court did not examine for accuracy the cited supportive statistics
which compared minority population and employment figures. 86 Wn. 2d at 704, 548
P.2d at 325. See note 39 supra. In addition, the selective certification rule and engi-
neering department implementation, notes 1 & 2 supra, established a goal approxi-
mating the minority ratio in the community, while the executive order, note 3 supra,
called for a ratio corresponding with the minority work force.
74. In dictum, the Supreme Court has indicated that statistics showing a racial
imbalance between work force composition and the general population are "proba-
tive" as a "telltale sign of purposeful discrimination" (i.e, Title VII liability). Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1856 n.20 (1977). Such
statistical evidence, however, would not require a racially balanced work force under
Title VII; after the liability phase, additional proceedings and evidence are relevant
to fashion appropriate relief. Id. at 1856 n.20.
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B. Voluntary Versus Manaatory Preferential Programs
In Lindsay, the court refused to adopt a different standard for re-
viewing voluntary programs from that appropriate for reviewing court-
mandated affirmative action plans.75 While a primary purpose of
Title VII is to encourage voluntary compliance,76 an argument has
been advanced for closer judicial scrutiny of voluntary programs be-
cause the extraordinary character of preferential relief demands judi-
cial supervision.7 7 This concern, however, is more accurately ad-
dressed to the deference to be accorded an independent determination
of a need to rectify past discriminatory practices. Faced with a reverse
discrimination challenge, the voluntary character of a preferential
75. "The fact that the City voluntarily has sought to achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunity in the public sphere rather than by court order does not detract
from or lessen the legal validity and necessity of its affirmative action program under
[Title VII] ." 86 Wn. 2d at 706, 548 P.2d at 326.
76. As noted in Lindsay, "Voluntary compliance, rather than court ordered re-
lief, is the congressionally preferred method of achieving equality of employment
opportunity." Id. Accord, Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
See also 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). It has been
suggested that courts are more reluctant to disturb quotas imposed under voluntary
affirmative action plans, Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970); EEOC set-
tlements, Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir.
1975); and consent decrees, United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46,
471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973). See 7 RUT.-CAM. LJ. 506
(1976). See also EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (culmination of protracted AT&T litigation imposing an affirmative action
override in a consent decree); Davidson, Preferential Treatment and Equal Oppor-
tunity, 55 ORE. L. REV. 53, 73 (1976). Any reluctance to disturb voluntary quotas
might be offset, however, by the additional consideration that a court-ordered quota
is based upon a showing of discrimination and limited by a termination point. Be-
cause these safeguards are lacking in voluntary preferential remedies, courts are
more likely to be justified in characterizing such remedies as a violation of § 703(a)
or (0) of Title VII, and requiring more intensive judicial review. See Goldman, The
Next Ten Years: Title VII Confronts the Constitution, 20 ST. Louis LJ. 308, 328
(1976).
77. In Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La.
1976), the court distinguished between voluntary quota systems and court-imposed
quota systems, stating that Title VII's proscriptions of discrimination were applicable
only to the former. The court enjoined the employer from implementing a minority
racial quota in a collective bargaining agreement, finding that such a quota violated
Title VII absent a showing of past discrimination and need for affirmative relief.
The court listed the following as "logical and compelling reasons" for the voluntary/
mandatory distinction:
First, because relief of this nature should be imposed with extreme caution and
discretion and only in those limited cases where necessary to cure the ill effects
of past discrimination. . . . Further, the administration of such relief by the
courts tends to assure that those remedial programs will be uniform in nature
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program should not determine the applicable standard of review.
Conversely, prior judicial approval under a court-mandated program
should not be conclusive validation without an independent examina-
tion of the program's continuing necessity and record of performance.
C. Employment Levels
The employment level at which preferential quotas are imposed has
been another consideration. Courts have demonstrated an inclination
to uphold entry-level hiring quotas while striking quotas imposing
promotional preferences.78 This tendency probably reflects the courts'
recognition that reverse discrimination is more discernible under pro-
motional preferential programs than entry-level plans.79 Although
Lindsay technically involved a promotional situation, plaintiff's
failure to claim a violation of seniority interests blurred any distinc-
tion between this case and an initial-hiring situation. Consequently,
the Lindsay court did not consider this distinction.
Beyond the hiring-promotion variable, greater judicial deference
has been accorded to quotas in union training and referral programs.8 0
In addition, courts have been more reluctant to impose quotas upon
white-collar positions than blue-collar positions.81 This difference may
reflect the limited capacity of courts to measure job abilities. Although
78. Problems inherent in quota relief assume different parameters in the promo-
tional context. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct.
1843 (1977) (validation of seniority system established under a union bargaining
agreement despite the perpetuation of pre-Act discrimination); Kirkland v. New
York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 73 (1976) (denied affirmative relief to offset discriminatory impact of pro-
motional exam); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767,
774 (2d Cir. 1975) (imposed goal on union membership but suggested court-ordered
relief be limited to "entry level positions"); Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir.
1975) (upheld hiring quota on low-level entry positions); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill,
473 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1973) (divided court upheld affirmative hiring quota but
declined to uphold promotional quota under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Bridgeport Guar-
dians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973) (same
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). See also 7 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 506, 519 (1976).
79. Reverse discrimination resulting from promotional programs is more evident
because, in most work settings, seniority and layoff priorities are explicitly or im-
plicitly in effect. Explicit priorities are an integral part of civil service employment,
and are generally incorporated in labor contracts. Implicit priorities arise because of
the societal expectation that workers with more experience ought to be the first to
receive job advancements.
80. See, e.g., Barnett v. International Harvester, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7538
(W.D. Tenn. 1976); Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971).
81. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973)
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adherence to this distinction may promote short-term acceptability of
preferential relief, the long-term goal of employment equality may be
delayed by restricting preferential remedies to blue-collar positions.
This differentiation may also fuel opposition from blue-collar
workers.
D. Identifiable Victims
An "identifiability" criterion has emerged in cases reviewing prefer-
ential programs absent a claim of reverse discrimination. This factor
requires evidence that a proposed quota will not produce "identifiable
reverse discrimination. '82 Courts which adopt this prerequisite for
approval of preferential plans are more likely to approve entry-level
programs than promotional plans. Potential reverse discrimination
victims of the former are frequently unidentifiable members of a gen-
eral hiring pool.83 Potential reverse discrimination victims of promo-
tional preferential treatment plans are more readily identifiable under
seniority systems or other ranking procedures. A rigid requirement
that there be no identifiable victims of reverse discrimination in such
cases would foreclose use of preferential promotional plans to alle-
viate discrimination.
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,8 4 the Supreme Court
(quota upheld for hiring foremen but denied for white-collar hiring); Chance v.
Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972) (approving denial of racial quota
for laying off supervisory personnel). In Edwards & Zahretsky, supra note 27, at
36-37, the authors state that "there does not appear to be any legitimate justifica-
tion for this distinction."
82. For example, in Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs.,
520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), a two-pronged test for quota relief was advanced which
required: (1) proof of "a clear cut pattern of long continued and egregious racial
discrimination" (see notes 70 & 71 supra), and (2) evidence that the quota would not
result in "identifiable reverse discrimination." 520 F.2d at 427. Inevitably, any pref-
erential treatment program diminishes the opportunities of non-minority individuals.
As noted by Judge Mansfield, dissenting to a denial of rehearing in Kirkland:
[R] eferences to "identifiable" Whites, while perhaps placing the consequences of
a goal into sharper focus, do not add to the reality that, irrespective of the
identifiability of the Whites, a goal inevitably serves to benefit some at the
expense of others . . . .The wisest and fairest course that we could follow is
not to reject this remedy but to specify the smallest quota in terms of percen-
tage and duration necessary to correct the past discrimination.
531 F.2d 5, 10 (1975). See Part IV-G infra.
83. See notes 8 & 36 supra. Although Lindsay involved an entry-level program,
plaintiff was able to base his challenge on the results of the civil service exam. This
test, however, lacked EEOC validation, and a passing score arguably was indicative
of presumptive qualification. See notes 39 & 55 supra.
84. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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held that a preferential treatment program granting constructive se-
niority to minority discriminatees was appropriate,85 despite the exist-
ence of potentially identifiable reverse discrimination victims.86 Thus,
under Franks, the existence of identifiable victims of reverse discrimi-
nation will not alone invalidate a preferential plan. Although Franks
was not a reverse discrimination challenge to a preferential plan, ex-
tending the Court's reasoning to such cases could validate plans that
operate to diminish "the expectations of other, arguably innocent,
employees."87 A reverse discimination challenge presupposes at least
one alleged victim, and the existence of other possible reverse discrim-
ination victims is a factor which a court should not discount.
E. Public Versus Private Employment
The Lindsay court relied upon public employment precedent; how-
ever, it did not emphasize the fact that Lindsay was a public employ-
ment case.88 Although some courts consider the imposition of quotas
upon public employers less objectionable, 89 the distinction between
public and private employment should not be given weight in adjudi-
85. While Franks granted relief to job applicants, a subsequent seniority case
extended relief under Franks to non-applicants. International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977). The scope of such relief was limited to victims
of post-Title VII discrimination; § 703(h) validated the seniority system as to pre-Act
discriminatees, see note 30 supra. Teamsters involved a union bargaining agreement
with a seniority system which allegedly perpetuated racial discrimination. The
court resolved the status of nonapplicants, left open by the decision in Franks, in
deciding that "failure to apply for a job is not an inexorable bar to retroactive
seniority." Presumptive entitlement must be proved, however. Id. at 1869.
86. 424 U.S. at 774-75. Franks involved a racially discriminatory hiring system.
The Court held that constructive seniority was appropriate relief for job applicants
subjected to past discrimination. The seniority they would have had "but for" the
discrimination could be denied only for reasons which would not frustrate the statu-
tory purposes of Title VII. See note 22 and accompanying text supra. See also Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1874 (1977) ("Although
not directly controlled by the Act, the extent to which the legitimate expectations of
nonvictim employees should determine when victims are restored ... is limited by
basic principles of equity.").
87. 424 U.S. at 774. The Franks Court stated that to deny relief solely on this
basis would "frustrate the central 'make-whole' objective of Title VII." Id.
88. The court relied on decisions requiring public agencies to institute affirmative
hiring relief. 86 Wn. 2d at 711, 548 P.2d at 329. See note 49 supra.
89. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 634, 638 (2d Cir.
1974) (Hays, J., dissenting). See also Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 NJ. 5, 367 A.2d
833 (1976). But see NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Pennsylvania v.
O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
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cating the validity of preferential treatment plans. 90 The "conse-
quences" test of Title VII focuses upon the victim's injury,91 not the
employer's status; therefore, it encompasses both public and private
discrimination. 92
F. Availability of Alternatives
The Lindsay court limited its examination to the preferential pro-
gram adopted; it did not discuss alternative methods of achieving
equality in city employment.93 Nevertheless, other courts have given
consideration to the existence of alternatives, especially in equal pro-
tection analysis. 94 Frequent emphasis upon the extraordinary char-
acter of preferential remedies95 suggests a partiality toward effective
alternatives. In order to ensure that an alternative measure promotes
equality without sacrificing efficacy, however, a court should closely
scrutinize the proposed alternative rather than merely suggest that it is
conceivable. 96
90. Fourteenth amendment protection against a denial of equal protection re-
quires state action. Thus, the "public" factor is of significance in a constitutional chal-
lenge which is raised in the context of governmental preferential treatment as an
impermissible racial classification. In NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974),
hirings under a preferential affirmative action order failed to "transgress either the
letter or the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment," despite an assumption that en-
forcement by state officials under a federal judicial order constituted state action. Id.
at 619. It remains questionable whether private employers acting under court-ordered
affirmative action plans have a sufficient "nexus" or significant involvement to satisfy
state action requirements under Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961), and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See
Slate, Preferential Relief in Employment Discrimination Cases, 5 Loy. CHI. L.J. 315,
338 n.73 (1974).
91. See note 23 supra.
92. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631 (2d Cir. 1974)
("Since the harm caused by private violations can be at least as serious as that re-
sulting from conduct of public bodies or officials, the relief must be commensurate
with the injury to be remedied.").
93. See notes 37-47 and accompanying text supra.
94. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 73 (1976); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053
(5th Cir. 1974) (en banc); Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553
P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976) (suggesting alternative to preferential admis-
sions program).
95. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc); Weber
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
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G. Durational Limits
Judicial acceptance of goal-based programs as opposed to "abso-
lute quota" systems indicates a preference for durational and achieve-
ment flexibility in program administration. The Lindsay "fair approx-
imation" standard reflects the concern that preferential programs not
become permanent fixtures.97
V. CONCLUSION
If preferential treatment is to be constitutionally and statutorily jus-
tified, as well as publicly and judicially accepted, its imposition must
be carefully specified and its implementation limited. Accepting the
desirability of equal economic opportunity, which may call for the
imposition of short-term color-conscious relief measures to attain long-
term colorblind goals, the current need is for some degree of predict-
ability and uniformity so that employers are not subject to shifting
liabilities. The Lindsay decision, while limited in its direct preceden-
tial effect, is indicative of continuing Washington support for affirma-
tive action programs. Future reverse discrimination lawsuits are likely
to challenge the justifications for preferential treatment set forth by
Justice Finley in Lindsay.
The Supreme Court's avoidance of intervention in the area has not
only failed to promote lower-court resolution, but has contributed to
96. Justice Tobriner, in his Bakke dissent, wrote: "If alternative remedies are
relevant to the constitutionality of the program at all, the party attacking the validity
of the program should bear the burden of demonstrating the realistic availability of
alternative methods of achieving the medical school's numerous objectives." Bakke
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 89, 553 P.2d 1152, 1190, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680, 718 (1976). The dissent criticized the suggested alternatives advanced by
the majority as "either disingenuous or impractical or both." Id. See also dissent from
denial of rehearing in Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs.,
531 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975) (majority had denied use of preferential goal-based relief):
When one considers the other alternative remedy that might be employed to
provide more effective relief [voiding all promotions under nonvalidated test],
the use of a temporary goal or quota looks even more attractive ....
Faced with a choice of relief measures, the district court wisely chose to
select the imposition of temporary goals as the less drastic remedy.
Id. at 9 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
97. See note 47 supra. The viability of such limitations, however, may be chal-
lenged. The likelihood of dismantling a preferential plan is questionable in light of
the entrenched nature of bureaucratic programs. Abandonment may also be a func-
tion of the presence of identifiable reverse discrimination victims challenging the pro-
gram. See Part IV-D supra.
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uncertainty and conflicting results. Because an increase in reverse dis-
crimination litigation can only be counterproductive in achieving
affirmative action goals, some accommodation of interests is necessary.
The use of Title VII as both a defensive and offensive weapon in such
suits requires clarification of both substantive and procedural standards
for review of preferential treatment programs. 98 The mode of analysis
outlined in this note is offered to aid in the prevention and resolution
of future conflicts.
Kerry Radcliffe
98. A more precise delineation of appropriate standards for validation of pref-
erential treatment programs would minimize potential liability for reverse discrim-
ination. It would not, however, eliminate the possibility of reverse discrimination
claims. One district court has attempted to compensate the reverse discrimination
victim without debilitating the challenged preferential program. McAleer v. Amer-
ican Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976). The case involved a sex dis-
crimination challenge to an affirmative action promotional plan in which the em-
ployer asserted an EEOC consent decree as a defense. In his opinion, Judge Gesell
extended the Supreme Court's reasoning in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747 (1976). See note 86 supra. While the reverse discrimination victim was not
entitled to a promotion because that would perpetuate the effects of past discrimin-
ation, he was allowed compensation in damages under Title VII. The plaintiff had
to prove, however, that he would have been promoted but for the affirmative action
plan. The remedial provision of Title VII invests courts with broad equitable
powers which have been invoked to impose affirmative relief. Awarding compensa-
tory relief to challengers of racial hiring preferences under the McAleer rationale,
however, would deter voluntary programs.
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